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ABSTRACT
Healthy corporate governance is necessary for attracting investor participation and alleviating corruption. Akin to 
other developing nations, two major challenges arise. First, Increasing foreign direct investments (FDIs) and second, 
controlling corruption are faced by all countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for their 
economic development. Phenomenal practices of whistleblowing policies in developed countries, especially in Europe 
and the US, have become crucial elements for modern corporate governance. Such practices also play important roles 
in detecting fraud and enhancing FDI and GDP growth. The aims of this study are twofold: to uncover the extent of the 
effects of whistleblowing disclosure quality on cost of equity (COE) and to propose whistleblowing disclosure scoring 
index as a new mechanism to integrate whistleblowing disclosure policy in the ASEAN region. Furthermore, a proposal 
for promulgating a comprehensive whistleblowing policy with inclusive internal and external programmes, which are 
necessary for establishing strong corporate governance, is presented. Empirical results confirm that whistleblowing 
disclosure quality has a significant negative relationship with COE. Our finding suggests that a uniform and comprehensive 
whistleblowing policy is needed to strengthen the best practices of ASEAN Corporate Governance Codes. 
Keywords: Whistleblowing policy; disclosure; cost of equity; corporate governance; ASEAN
ABSTRAK
Tadbir urus korporat yang sihat adalah penting untuk menarik penglibatan pelabur luar dan mencegah rasuah. Seperti 
mana negara-negara membangun yang lain, terdapat dua cabaran dalam meningkatkan pembangunan ekonomi 
negara-negara Kesatuan Asia Tenggara (ASEAN) iaitu; meningkatkan FDI dan mengawal rasuah. Secara praktikal, polisi 
pendedahan penyelewengan di negara maju, terutamanya Eropah dan Amerika Syarikat mengambil kira tadbir urus 
korporat yang moden sebagai satu elemen penting dan berperanan untuk mencegah penipuan. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk 
mencapai dua perkara; pertama, sejauh manakah pendedahan penyelewengan yang berkualiti dapat mengurangkan 
kos ekuiti dan kedua mencadangkan indeks skor bagi pendedahan penyelewengan sebagai satu mekanisme baru untuk 
mengintegrasikan polisi pendedahan penyelewengan di serantau ASEAN. Kajian ini juga mengemukakan cadangan-
cadangan untuk memperluaskan polisi pendedahan penyelewengan secara komprehensif dengan merangkumi program 
dalaman dan luaran di mana ianya penting untuk memperkukuhkan tadbir urus korporat. Merujuk kepada keputusan 
empirikal, kualiti pendedahan penyelewengan mempunyai hubungan yang signifikan negatif terhadap kos ekuiti. Keputusan 
kajian mencadangkan bahawa perlunya satu polisi pendedahan penyelewengan yang seragam dan komprehensif untuk 
memperkukuh amalan baik Tabdir Urus Korporat ASEAN.
Kata kunci: Polisi pendedahan penyelewengan; pendedahan; kos ekuiti; tadbir urus korporat; ASEAN 
InTRODUCTIOn 
since the introduction of the sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, 
corporate whistleblowing has been increasingly perceived 
as a critical element in corporate governance reforms 
around the world (Callahan et al. 2003). Whistleblowing 
refers to an initiative to disclose immoral, illegal and 
illegitimate practices within an organisation (Rachagan 
& Kuppusamy 2013). This disclosure is performed by 
former or current employees under the authority of 
their employers (Fasterling & Lewis 2014) and persons 
or organisations (Ahmad et al. 2013) who can execute 
consequent actions. Whistleblowing involves two kinds: 
internal (report wrongdoings to someone within an 
organisation) or external (report wrongdoings to someone 
outside the organisation, such as media or government 
agencies) (Dworkin & Baucus 1998). 
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Most whistleblowers are motivated to report 
internally rather than externally because they are loyal 
to their organisation and prefer to reduce cost (nielsen 
2018). However, if they fail to report internally because 
they fail to get any response from the internal channel or 
fear of retaliation in subtle ways, such as being shunned 
by co-workers, selective downsizing, harassment by 
supervisors and victimisation, then whistleblowers may 
report externally. The increasing number of external 
whistleblowing incidents contributes negative effects 
on whistleblowers, such as physical, emotional, social 
and spiritual effects, and negatively impacts the ethical 
behaviour of organisations (Park & Lewis 2018). As a result, 
investor trust and participation are reduced. Therefore, 
companies are advised to disclose a comprehensive 
whistleblowing policy in their internal reporting system 
and provide a clear picture related to whistleblowers’ 
protection, encourage the internal whistleblowing process 
and increase investor confidence. 
In Australia, the revised principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations of 2007 
state that publicly listed companies should establish and 
disclose in their annual reports the code of conducts, which 
includes provisions related to whistleblowing (Lee & 
Fargher 2013). In some countries, whistleblowing policy 
disclosure in annual reports is mandatory. For instance, 
all companies in the UK, Us and Belgium should comply 
with the provisions or explain why, in specific situations, 
they do not comply (Hassink, De Vries & Bollen 2007). 
In developing countries, such as Malaysia, whistleblowers 
are protected under a specific law of the Whistleblower 
Protection Act (WPA) of 2010 (Meng & Fook 2011). 
In addition, Recommendation 1.3 of Principle 1 of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 states 
that ‘the code of conduct should include appropriate 
communication and feedback channels which facilitate 
whistleblowing’.  Although whistleblowing policy is 
commonly known in developing countries, the challenges 
lie on the Association of south East Asian nations 
(AsEAn) 5 countries due to the lack of specific laws for 
whistleblower protection in the region. For example, 
no specific law for whistleblower protection has been 
promulgated in singapore, Indonesia and Thailand 
(Global Integrity 2007). notwithstanding, more than 
a dozen rules of protecting whistleblowers have been 
provided in some countries, such as singapore (Meng 
& Fook 2011). According to the 2010 APEC Economy 
Policy Report, whistleblower rights in the Philippines are 
weakly protected even though the WPA was put in place in 
the 14th Congress of the Philippines. The best practices 
of the AsEAn Corporate Governance (AsEAn-CG) Codes 
propose that a detailed whistleblowing policy is necessary 
to achieve good-quality corporate governance practices in 
AsEAn countries (ACMF 2013). 
similarly, in the corporate governance literature, 
whistleblowing policy is an element of internal reporting 
system and one of the effective mechanisms to combat fraud 
(Lee & Fargher 2013). A great extent of whistleblowing 
policy in companies’ code of conduct indicates that a 
great whistleblowing system should be put in place in 
such organisations. Extant literature has established 
the importance of whistleblowing policy disclosures 
in corporate governance statements to instil trust and 
confidence among investors. Hassink et al. (2007) argued 
that a code of conduct can significantly reduce unethical 
behaviours within organisations. Accordingly, it increases 
company reputation and investor expectations. Chen et 
al. (2009), proved that great disclosures of firm-related 
information decrease firms’ capital cost due to their 
significant role in the assessment of firm value. Moreover, 
McKinsey surveys have concluded that institutional 
investors are willing to pay high premium for shares 
in firms with good corporate governance practices, 
especially when such firms are in countries that provides 
legal protection for investors (Holder-Webb et al. 2008). 
However, the inconsistent disclosure of whistleblowing 
policy contents among publicly listed companies provides 
an opportunity to examine the effects of whistleblowing 
policy disclosure on capital cost valuation. This issue is 
relevant to the AsEAn-CG standards and practices in which 
the objective of corporate governance is to integrate and 
strengthen such standards among publicly listed AsEAn 
companies and increase foreign direct investments in 
the region. such investments achieve the predominant 
objectives of the AsEAn Economic Community (AEC) 
as a single market and production base. A uniform 
whistleblowing policy at the regional level can enhance 
managerial monitoring and minimise power abuse (Lee 
et al. 2018). Thus, the idiosyncratic component of cost of 
equity (CoE) reduces and benefits shareholders.
This research aims to examine the effects of 
whistleblowing policy disclosure on the COE in AsEAn 5 
publicly listed companies, namely, Malaysia, Thailand, 
singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. We expect that 
a detailed whistleblowing policy disclosure can enhance 
an efficient accounting standard enforcement regarding the 
prevention of unethical behaviours and reduce CoE. We 
also propose whistleblowing disclosure scoring index as 
a new mechanism to improve whistleblowing disclosure 
quality in AsEAn. The index is based on the relevant 
disclosure requirement of AsEAn-CG scorecard and a 
recommended disclosure checklist provided by standards 
Australia (2003), OECD Whistleblower Protection Report 
(2012) and the UK Whistleblowing Commission Report 
(2013).
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three 
ways. Firstly, we provide new insights into the importance 
of whistleblowing disclosure quality in cultivating investor 
interest by investigating the effects of whistleblowing 
policy disclosure on firms’ CoE. Secondly, we extend 
agency theory by providing a new empirical evidence on 
whistleblowing policy disclosure and COE as asymmetry 
information problems among principles and agents. Lastly, 
we propose whistleblowing disclosure scoring index as 
a new mechanism in AsEAn 5 publicly listed companies 
by benchmarking with disclosure checklist provided 
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by standards Australia (2003), OECD Whistleblower 
Protection Report (2012) and the UK Whistleblowing 
Commission Report (2013).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section 
II presents a literature review on whistleblowing policy 
disclosure and COE in AsEAn 5 countries. section III 
extends whistleblowing disclosure scoring index and 
underlying research methodologies. section IV presents 
the empirical results and discussion and finally offers 
conclusion remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
AsEAn-CG AnD WHIsTLEBLOWInG POLICY
AsEAn EAC, which is established in 2015, is a major 
platform that aims to improve AsEAn’s regional economic 
agenda (AsEAn secretariat 2008). Its main objective is to 
establish AsEAn as a single market and production base, 
with free flow of goods, services, investments, skilled 
labour and capital across the border of AsEAn countries. 
Currently, AsEAn economy is the sixth largest in the world 
and third largest in Asia with a combined gross domestic 
product of Us$2.55 trillion in 2016 (AsEAn secretariat 
2017).
To achieve EAC objectives, the AsEAn Capital Markets 
Forum (ACMF) was established in 2004. ‘Attracting greater 
investor participation’ is among the six key priorities 
highlighted in the first phase of ACMF Action Plan 2016-
2020 (ACMF 2009). Thus, the AsEAn-CG scorecard was 
created to improve investor confidence in the quality of 
the corporate governance standards and practices among 
AsEAn publicly listed companies. six AsEAn countries-
Malaysia, Thailand, singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Vietnam-have agreed to participate in this initiative.
During the seven years’ experience in implementing 
AsEAn-CG (starting from 2012), six participating countries 
have faced obstacles and constraints in balancing their 
national characteristics to meet the integrated objectives 
of ACMF and achieve international best practices of AsEAn-
CG. However, companies still face challenges to comply 
with a comprehensive disclosure of whistleblowing policy, 
as one of the disclosure and transparency improvements in 
AsEAn (ACMF 2013). In the AsEAn-CG scorecard Country 
Reports and Assessments 2012-2013, Asian Development 
Bank reported that all AsEAn-CG participating countries, 
except singapore, failed to disclose a comprehensive 
whistleblowing policy (AsEAn 2013). similarly, in 2014 
and 2015, establishing whistleblowing policies is still a 
critical area for improvement in all participating countries, 
except singapore (ACMF 2015). 
In Malaysia, the number of companies that provide 
a procedure in place for employees to complain about 
illegal and unethical behaviours decreased from 67% in 
2014 to 58% in 2015 (ACMF 2015). A similar reduction 
trend occurred in 2015, where the number of companies 
with policies and procedures in protecting employees 
or individuals from retaliation when they reveal illegal 
and/or unethical behaviours, have decreased from 52% in 
2014 to 46%. A significant reduction in the whistleblower 
protection disclosure within publicly listed Malaysian 
companies in other ways, reflect investor uncertainty on 
organisations’ ethical behaviour, which, in turn, reflects 
investment decisions. 
Hassink et al. (2007) conducted a research entitled 
‘A Content Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies of 
Leading European Companies.’ They found that a detailed 
whistleblowing policy disclosure might significantly affect 
company image on criminal and ethical behaviours. Thus, 
in achieving great investor participation, AsEAn member 
countries must provide a uniform set of whistleblowing 
policies with a comprehensive content that specify external 
and internal whistleblowing procedures and robust 
whistleblower protection (Hassink et al. 2007).
WHIsTLEBLOWInG DIsCLOsURE QUALITY AnD COE
Researchers have been focusing on whistleblowing policy 
disclosure since the 1980s. Two perspectives can also be 
considered. Firstly, whistleblowing disclosures signal an 
effective whistleblowing system in organisations. For 
example, somers (2001) and Adams, Tashchian and shore 
(2001) found that employees from companies that disclose 
ethical codes experience few wrongdoings because 
they treat themselves more ethically than companies 
without such ethical codes. some disclosure serves as an 
effective whistleblowing system in companies. Moreover, 
whistleblowing disclosure mitigates problems due to 
fraud and corruption because the disclosure encourages 
whistleblowers to blow the whistle (Lee & Fargher 2013). 
A detailed whistleblowing policy disclosure signals a good 
whistleblowing system in place and influences investors 
to take large positions in firm share. The positive attitude 
of investors leads to high demand for firm security, which 
raises the current prices of firm share and reduces the COE. 
Thus, shareholders who are confident with firms’ ability 
to curb fraud and corruption may be willing to accept a 
low risk premium, thus reducing the COE (Ramly 2012). 
secondly, a rising probability of whistleblowing disclosure 
may restrict other organisation members’ doubtful 
activities and increase risks and further constraints on 
a wide scope of organisation activities (schmidt 2005). 
Consequently, capital cost increases. Thus, the argument 
on to what extent the level of whistleblowing policy 
disclosure influences the COE is still questionable in the 
accounting and financial literature. 
The theoretical underpinnings of this study are 
mainly provided by agency theory. The theory suggests 
that high disclosure of accounting information, such as 
whistleblowing policy in the Code of Conduct, resolves 
agency problems between the management and owner. 
The attempt to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors reduces the idiosyncratic 
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component of CoE (Healy & Palepu 2001). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is proposed.
H1 Whistleblowing policy disclosure negatively affects 
CoE.
METHODOLOGY
This study focuses on all companies from AsEAn 5 markets 
(except singapore security market) listed in each country’s 
main market, such as Bursa Malaysia, stock Exchange 
of Thailand, Indonesia stock Exchange and Philippine 
stock Exchange. singapore security market is excluded 
from this research due to its different economic size and 
market maturity (singapore as a developed country). 
All finance-related firms, insurance, closed-fund banks 
and unit trust companies are excluded from the sample 
because the high leverage ratios of financial firms to 
non-financial firms may affect our results (Boubakri et 
al. 2012). Financial firms also have different compliance, 
financial reporting standards and regulatory requirements 
and framework from non-financial firms (Lee & Fargher 
2013). In addition, we excluded companies that do not 
disclose their whistleblowing policies on their annual 
reports and companies with missing values on financial 
measurement data.
Through the AsEAn-CG codes and practices, 
whistleblowing data are readily available as voluntary 
disclosure at firms’ annual reports. The annual financial 
data are gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
2015 is selected as the study period to represent the period 
after the implementation of the AsEAn-CG initiatives in 
AsEAn 5 countries. Table 1 summarises the sampling 
data selection.
TABLE 1. sample selection
                                Description                             number of companies
  Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines
Initial selection of companies from main market 919 705 558 269
Less:    
• Finance-related firms 51 58 88 37
• Companies with missing values on financial measurement data 609 374 348 130
• Companies that do not disclose their whistleblowing policies 48 72 45 67
 on their corporate governance statement
Final sample of companies with detailed, publicly available 211 201 77 35
whistleblowing policies and financial data
Total sample size                           524
Percentage                           21.4%
MEAsUREMEnT OF VARIABLEs
On the basis of the data availability in the four AsEAn 
countries, this research uses short-term stock prices 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts by employing modified 
economy-wide growth model (γGM) proposed by Gode 
and Mohanram (2003) as a proxy to COE. The short-term 
growth rates are captured from I/B/E/s database. The 
formula is as follows:
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DPs is the dividend per share, and gst is a short-term 
growth. γGM considers that short-term growth can be set 
equal to the following:
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MEAsUREMEnT FOR WHIsTLEBLOWInG 
DIsCLOsURE QUALITY
This study employs whistleblowing disclosure scoring 
index (WBDI) as a proxy for whistleblowing disclosure 
quality. Table 2 reports that WBDI is directly developed 
through self-constructed index on the basis of voluntary 
disclosure scorecard. The scorecard is based on the relevant 
disclosure requirement of AsEAn-CG scorecard and a 
recommended disclosure checklist provided by standards 
Australia (2003), OECD Whistleblower Protection 
Report (2012) and the UK Whistleblowing Commission 
Report (2013). For example, standards Australia (2003) 
recommends that reports should be kept confidential and 
secured within the law. Considering this recommendation, 
we have included an item in the scorecard (item 6 in Table 
2) that examines whether companies have disclosed that 
reports should be kept confidential and secured within 
the law. standards Australia (2003) also recommends the 
provision of a whistleblowing protection officer. Given 
this recommendation, an item on our scorecard examines 
whether companies have disclosed the appointment of a 
whistleblowing protection officer (item 14 in Table 4). 
The scorecard is applied to the whistleblowing policy 
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report of each company to determine the extent of 
whistleblowing disclosures. For each disclosure item, the 
existence of the disclosure is coded ‘1’ if present and ‘0’ 
otherwise. We adopt a weighted-average index score for 
all disclosures made for each firm. A total of 14 disclosure 
items are examined from the whistleblowing policies of 
companies in the sample, giving a maximum score of 
14. High scores represent great overall whistleblowing 
disclosure.
Table 2 presents the frequency of disclosed items by 
companies in the samples. From the data, all companies in 
Malaysia provide a statement that companies are generally 
committed to a culture of corporate compliance and ethical 
behaviour. Companies in Indonesia disclose with an 
average score of 53.25 (Table 2, no. 1). Companies that 
separate communication channels to receive complaints 
from internal and external parties are recorded below 
average, in which the highest score is only 57.35 (Table 
2, no. 2). The scope of the whistleblowing policy applied 
to employees is recorded higher (Table 2, no. 3) than the 
policy score that extends to non-employees (Table 2, no. 
4) for all AsEAn 5 countries, except for Malaysia, which 
shows that 49.76 is the policy score for employees and 
51.18 for non-employees.
TABLE 2. Whistleblowing disclosure scoring index
 no.               Disclosure Item of Whistleblowing source *       Frequency of Item Reported by Companies in
                           Policy scorecard                                    the sample (n = 524)
    Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines
    % % % %
 1 A general statement of the entity's commitment to a 1, 2, 3 100.00 78.26 53.25 73.48
  ulture of corporate compliance and ethical behaviour
 2 A statement that separates communication channels to. 1, 2, 3 57.35 56.52 50.65 27.27
  receive complaints from internal and external parties is 
  provided
 3 Clearly define a scope that applies to employees 1, 2, 3 49.76 43.48 38.96 63.16
  (including contractors and consultants)
 4 Clearly define a scope that applies to non-employees  1, 2, 3 51.18 21.74 27.27 47.37
  (customers, general public)
 5 A statement of the benefits and importance to the entity  1 45.50 13.04 18.18 15.79
  of having a whistleblowing mechanism
 6 A statement that reporting should be kept confidential 1, 3 56.40 52.17 25.97 36.84
  and secured within the law
 7 A guarantee that whistleblowers must receive feedback 1 49.76 13.04 32.47 15.79
 8 Description of the specific protection given and the 1, 2, 3 48.82 43.48 44.16 12.53
  actions that should be taken
 9 A description of the types of concerns, in which  1 49.76 34.78 41.56 5.26
  whistleblowing mechanisms are appropriate to use
 10 Guidelines on who to report to 1 48.34 34.78 18.18 15.26
 11 Guidelines on how to report 1 48.34 30.43 16.88 15.26
 12 A commitment to regularly review whistleblowing 1, 2, 3 20.38 4.35 16.88 3.42
  programmes for effectiveness
 13 no retaliation by company, if report is made in good faith 1, 2, 3 29.86 26.09 15.58 5.26
 14 A commitment to appoint and maintain an appropriately 1 12.32 8.7 53.25 5.26
  qualified whistleblower protection officer is accessible to
  all staff
*Note:  1. Recommended disclosure checklist provided by standards Australia (2003);
 2. OECD Whistleblower Protection Report (2012) (OECD 2012);
 3. UK Whistleblowing Commission Report (2013) (PCaW 2013)
Comparatively, few disclosures are provided by 
companies on the benefits of whistleblowing mechanism 
(Table 2, no. 5), feedback to whistleblowers (Table 2, no. 
7), commitment to review whistleblowing programmes 
(Table 2, no. 12) and commitment to appoint and maintain 
an appropriately qualified whistleblower protection officer 
(Table 2, No. 14). With regard to confidentiality (Table 2, 
no. 6), protection (Table 2, no. 8) and retaliation (Table 
2, no 13), companies from Malaysia and Thailand report 
higher score than those from Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The same trend is recorded for the guidelines on the types 
of whistleblowing mechanisms (Table 2, no. 9), who 
to report to (Table 2, no. 10) and how to report (Table 
2, no. 11). Overall, the descriptive data suggests that 
most firms in the sample do not provide comprehensive 
policy disclosures. This finding is consistent with 
the recommendations from international standards 
whistleblowing disclosure checklist for their effective 
whistleblowing system.
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COnTROL VARIABLEs
The selection of control variables included in this study 
is primarily based on prior studies. The control variables 
are firm size, leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB). 
Firm Size Firm size is measured on the basis of the 
natural log of assets (LTA). According to previous 
literature, firm size is inversely related to equity and 
default risk. Large firms have low capital cost because 
they enjoy great stability (Gray et al. 2009; Li et al. 2009; 
Ramly 2012).
LEV LEV is measured by the ratio of the total liabilities to 
total assets. Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that firms’ 
COE increases with its debt – equity ratio. The greater the 
financial leverage, the greater the demand for monitoring 
and disclosure and the higher the agency costs arising 
from managerial discretion to shift resources away from 
shareholders and the greater the demand for monitoring 
and disclosure; thus, the higher the COE (Gray et al. 2009; 
Li et al. 2009; Ramly 2012).
ROA ROA is measured as operating income to total assets. 
ROA is a proxy for company performance. Profitable 
firms decrease default risk. Hence, prior empirical studies 
document a negative association between firm profitability 
and COE (Gray et al. 2009; Li et al. 2009; Ramly 2012).
MTB Ratio This ratio is measured by the market value 
of common share to the book value of common share. 
MTB ratio has a negative relationship with COE because 
high book-to-market firms are expected to have high 
ex-post realised returns. Moreover, firms with high 
MTB ratio are expected to have high share prices and 
investment opportunities (Fama & French 1997). Hence, 
high investment opportunities are associated with high 
long-term growth in earnings and cash-flows. Thus, COE 
is expected to be low for high MTB firms. 
Given this discussion, the following model is 
estimated to analyse the extent of whistleblowing 
disclosure quality and COE.
ϒGM = β0 +β1WBDI +β2LTA +β3LEV +β4ROA +
β5MTB + ε,                                                 (4)
where WBDI and financial variables are as previously 
defined. β0… β5 represent regression coefficients, and γ 
represents the error term. Moreover, ϒGM is the modified 
economy-wide growth model. Table 3 provides a definition 
of the research variables of this study.
TABLE 3. Definition of research variables
              Variable Symbol                                                          Definition
Cost of equity ϒGM Modified economy-wide growth model measured by short-term stock 
  prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts
Whistleblowing disclosure WBDI Percentage of the sum of the scores awarded for each item in the WBDI 
scoring index  (i.e. the sum of the scores awarded divided by the total number of 
  items in the WBDI [maximum score])
Total assets TA natural LTA
Leverage LEV Ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Return on assets ROA Ratio of operating income to total assets
Market-to-book ratio MTB Ratio of market value of common share to book value of common share
REsULTs
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistic results of the 
overall COE, WBDI and control variables. The means of 
COE ranges from 0.373 to 2.790, with companies in the 
Philippines representing the highest mean. Based on the 
full sample n = 524, AsEAn 5 firms have adopted slightly 
below 50% of the desirable whistleblowing disclosure 
quality. Firms in Malaysia have commendable standards 
of whistleblowing disclosure quality, whereas those in the 
Philippines have a deplorable quality as evidenced by the 
lowest score of 0.182. These results indicate that AsEAn 
5 countries (except singapore) lack in whistleblowing 
disclosure quality, and no standard integration is provided 
among these countries. Certain firms still fall behind the 
desirable AsEAn-CG standards and practices.
REGREssIOn REsULTs
Table 5 provides the regression results on the impact 
of WBDI on ϒGM  after controlling for the effects of firm 
size, LEV, MTB ratio and firm performance. WBDI has a 
significant negative relationship with ϒGM  at 1% to 5% 
TABLE 4. Descriptive analysis
                          Mean
Variable Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines
ϒGM  0.373 2.782 1.819 2.790
WBDI 0.482 0.328 0.298 0.182
TA 6.381 7.526 10.292 8.065
LEV 0.449 0.820 0.562 0.529
MTB 2.933 5.503 4.144 2.802
ROA 0.079 0.077 0.094 0.078
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level for all AsEAn 5 countries, except for the Philippines. 
This finding suggests that good whistleblowing disclosure 
quality predicts low ϒGM , thus supporting H1. Although 
WBDI and ϒGM  are insignificant in listed companies in the 
Philippines, the coefficient is negative at –1.710. Firm size 
(TA), MTB and ROA have significant negative relationships 
with ϒGM, indicating that large firms with high investment 
opportunities likely enjoy low ϒGM. Moreover, company 
LEV has a significant positive relationship with ϒGM. This 
result is in line with the expectation that the greater the 
financial leverage, the greater the demand for monitoring 
and disclosure and the higher the agency costs arising 
from managerial discretion to shift resources away from 
shareholders. Thus, ϒGM is high (Gray et al. 2009; Li et 
al. 2009; Ramly 2012).
MAnAGERIAL IMPLICATIOn 
This study attempts to explain the effects of whistleblowing 
policy disclosure on the COE of 524 companies from 
AsEAn 5 market (except singapore security market). Those 
listed in each country’s main market are Bursa Malaysia, 
stock Exchange of Thailand, Indonesia stock Exchange 
and Philippine stock Exchange. By introducing a new 
whistleblowing disclosure scoring index to the literature, 
we intend to obtain evidence that whistleblowing quality 
plays an important role in increasing FDI and reducing COE. 
Whistleblowing quality is assessed using a self-developed 
WBDI comprising 14 item scores. The quality measures are 
derived from the provisions of the AsEAn-CG scorecard; a 
recommended disclosure checklist provided by standards 
Australia (2003), OECD Whistleblower Protection Report 
(2012) and the UK Whistleblowing Commission Report 
(2013); and various prior studies. Regression results 
indicate that firms with high-quality whistleblowing 
disclosure have low COE. Furthermore, this research finds 
that, on average, AsEAn 5 firms have adopted slightly 
below 50% of the desirable whistleblowing disclosure 
quality, thus recommending improvement. 
We suggest that AsEAn 5 publicly listed companies 
should disclose a clear and detailed whistleblowing 
policy in their annual report to reduce CoE and attract 
many investors. Whistleblowing policy disclosure on 
the benefits of whistleblowing mechanism, feedback to 
whistleblowers, commitment to review whistleblowing 
programmes and commitment to appoint and maintain an 
appropriately qualified whistleblower protection officer 
must also be highlighted by AsEAn 5 publicly listed 
companies because attention to disclosure is decreasing. 
We propose ACMF to provide WBDI as a new mechanism 
or a comprehensive guideline for AsEAn 5 countries 
in achieving a uniform whistleblowing policy. such a 
policy is an initiative to improve the best practice of 
AsEAn Code of Corporate Governance. Furthermore, we 
propose a mandatory provision for disclosing the details 
of whistleblowing policy for limited private companies 
in their annual report. This provision can train their 
employees about reporting suspected violations.
This study makes several noteworthy contributions to 
the accounting and finance literature. Firstly, the empirical 
findings provide a new understanding on the effects of 
whistleblowing disclosure quality on CoE, especially in 
the case of AsEAn 5 countries. secondly, we provide a 
new whistleblowing policy disclosure scoring index as an 
empirical guideline to academicians for future research. 
Lastly, we extend the agency theory as an underpinning 
theory in explaining the effects of whistleblowing 
disclosure quality on CoE. However, our research also has 
limitations. In this study, we do not measure the effects of 
publicly listed Vietnamese companies due to the difficulty 
in capturing whistleblowing data from most of their annual 
reports. Thus, this limitation must be addressed in future 
research.
TABLE 5. Direct relationship between COE and WBDI
   WBDI        
  Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Philippines  
Variable Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats
WBDI –0.149 2.31 ** –4.994 –2.27 ** –1.062 –3.28 * –1.710 –0.35 
TA –0.226 6.52 * –2.966 –7.77 * –0.450 –3.78 * –3.214 1.73 ***
LEV 0.097 0.74  0.135 1.97 ** 0.287 0.69  1.591 0.27 
MTB –0.007 –1.51  –0.012 –0.92  –0.013 –1.03  –0.002 –2.29 **
ROA –2.450 9.12 * –1.486 –1.03  –3.940 –3.21 * –27.293 1.21 
Constant –1.362 –6.64 * 17.798 5.52 * –2.970 –2.51 ** –25.797 –1.81 ***
n 211   201   77   35  
F value 0.000   0.0000   0.000   0.219  
Adjusted R2 0.4171   0.2909   0.349   0.206  
R2 0.4029     0.3086     0.3032     0.0691 
   
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the given variable is statistically significant up to 1% significance level, ** for 5% significance level and *** for 
10% significance level.
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COnCLUsIOn
Whistleblowing has already demonstrated tools of 
sound corporate governance to fight against corruption, 
captivate FDI for economic growth and protect regional 
vulnerability from financial crisis. Various regional 
communities and forums have adopted whistleblowing 
policies and guidelines, such as Australian standards 
(2003), EU Resolution 2060 and Guiding Principles for 
Whistleblower Protection Legislation 2010 recommended 
by the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, as well 
as international and national initiatives. AsEAn is 
no longer an exception. Although the importance of 
effective implementation of corporate governance has 
already been emphasised in various AsEAn documents, 
whistleblowing policy is a recent and incomprehensive 
element that has taken place through AsEAn-CG scorecard, 
which covers the OECD Corporate Governance Principles 
regarding whistleblowing. AsEAn-CG scorecard Country 
Report and Assessment of 2013–2014 rightly mentions 
that companies in member states, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, still 
face challenges in disclosing whistleblowing. Therefore, 
whistleblowing policy disclosure requires improvement 
from these poor areas. Policies and procedures to protect 
whistleblowers also need attention by considering the 
provided suggestions and proposed policy because policy 
is more effective than acts and codes. 
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